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PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE 
U.S. HOG SLAUGHTERING INDUSTRY 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
 Conventional wisdom holds that a small and decreasing number of hog slaughter firms 
are using their “market power” to take advantage of U.S. hog producers.  Existing studies have 
simply calculated industry concentration ratios and assumed/asserted that the performance of 
such a concentrated industry must be different from the performance of a perfectly competitive 
industry.  These researchers have rejected without testing the hypothesis that:  the observed 
performance of the U.S. hog slaughter industry is not different from the performance that would 
be generated by a perfectly competitive industry. 
 This paper derives the theoretical relationships between hog and pork prices, and hence 
the farm-wholesale price spread, that would exist in a perfectly competitive slaughter hog 
market.  These performance norms are then confronted with observed weekly price/quantity 
relationships over the 1991-2001 period to compare observed market performance with the ideal 
performance norms derived from the economic theory of a perfectly competitive market. 
 Based on the market performance measures derived from economic theory of a perfectly 
competitive market, the hypothesis that the U.S. hog slaughter hog market is a perfectly 
competitive market cannot be rejected.  There simply is not any evidence to support allegations 
of abuse of market power by meat packers. 
 
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF THE 
U.S. HOG SLAUGHTERING INDUSTRY* 
 
J. Bruce Bullock** 
 
 
 Conventional wisdom holds that a small and decreasing number of hog slaughter firms 
are using their “market power” to take advantage of U.S. hog producers.  This paradigm has 
provided the “justification” for numerous studies that purport to measure the market distortions 
supposedly generated by meat packers use of market power.  See Barkema, et al., and also Ward 
for references to a number of these studies. 
 Existing studies have simply calculated industry concentration ratios and assumed/ 
asserted that the performance of such a concentrated industry must be different from the 
performance of a perfectly competitive slaughter industry.  These researchers have proceeded to 
develop a myriad of “measures of market power.”  These researchers have rejected without 
testing the hypothesis that:  the observed performance of the U.S. slaughter hog market is not 
different from the performance that would be generated by a perfectly competitive slaughter 
market. 
 The scientific method of research requires that this hypothesis be tested as part of the 
rejection process.  Computation of industry concentration ratios is not a valid test of this 
hypothesis.  Highly concentrated industries may well perform no differently than a perfectly 
competitive industry. 
 Bullock (a) has used the economic theory of perfectly competitive markets to develop an 
analytical framework that challenges the existing conventional wisdom.  Moreover, this 
framework provides the foundation for statistical testing of hypotheses about the performance of 
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the U.S. slaughter hog market.  The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the consistency of the 
analytical framework derived from the theory of perfect markets with observed market clearing 
weekly prices and quantities in the U.S. hog/pork market over the 1991-2001 period.  The 
parameters of the perfectly competitive model are estimated and hypotheses are tested regarding 
the ability of the estimated perfect market model to explain observed data relationships. 
Background 
 There are four central conclusions/assertions of the Bullock model. 
I. The biological production process of producing slaughter hogs requires 10 months 
from sow breeding to slaughter of the pigs obtained from the breeding decision.  
Hence producers – not packers – determine the number of slaughter hogs 
available for slaughter each week.  The supply of slaughter hogs marketed in the 
third week of month X was determined 10 months previous and is perfectly 
inelastic with respect to the market price of slaughter hogs that week. (Bullock, b) 
II. The short run cost curves of hog slaughter plants are u-shaped as explained by 
economic theory.  (Bullock, b) 
III. The U.S. hog slaughter industry is an oligopsony.  However, the necessary and 
sufficient conditions for hog slaughtering firms to possess and exercise “market 
power” do not exist since packers do not determine the number of slaughter hogs 
ready for slaughter each week and packers purchase all hogs available each week.  
Profit seeking packers competing for market share (and hence profits) will 
establish the price charged for their services (i.e., the farm-wholesale price 
spread) equal to the marginal cost of slaughtering the number of animals available 
for slaughter.  Consequently the derived demand for hogs by the oligopsonistic 
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hog slaughter industry is not different from what the derived farm level demand 
for hogs would be with a much larger number of slaughter firms.  (Bullock, c) 
IV. The farm level derived demand curve for hogs has an inverted u-shape as a result 
of subtracting u-shaped slaughter cost curves from a linear or log linear, price 
dependent wholesale demand curve for pork.  Consequently, the absolute value of 
the farm level demand flexibility coefficient increases exponentially as the daily 
slaughter rate increases.  In contrast, the wholesale level demand price flexibility 
is only marginally affected by the slaughter rate and may even be constant if the 
wholesale level demand curve is log linear with respect to the quantity moving 
through the market.  (Bullock, c) 
 The balance of this paper focuses on developing empirical estimates of parameters 
defined by the economic model of a perfectly competitive U.S. slaughter hog market.  Statistical 
tests are then developed regarding the consistency of the data relationships specified in the model 
with observed data relationships (market performance) during the 574 weeks of market clearing 
prices and quantities observed over the 1991-2001 calendar years. 
Estimation of Marginal Cost 
of Hog Slaughter 
 
 Pork packers are margin makers.  They are price takers in the wholesale meat market.  
Packers are price makers at the farm level.  Consequently packers determine the magnitude of 
the farm-wholesale price spread (i.e. the payment for hog slaughtering services). 
 (1) Sf-w = Pw - Pf 
  where  Sf-w =   farm-wholesale price spread 
   Pw =  wholesale price of meat 
   Pf       =   farm level price of live animals 
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 In a perfectly competitive market, packers would determine the farm level price (Pf), and 
hence the farm-wholesale price spread, by subtracting their marginal cost of slaughter (C) from 
the exogenously determined wholesale price of pork meat (Pw).  Thus, in a perfectly competitive 
market the farm level price of hogs would be determined as: 
 (2) P P Cf w= −  
  where    Pf =   farm level value of hogs 
      Pw =   wholesale price of pork meat 
  C =   marginal non-animal cost of  slaughtering  the animals  moving 
                 through the market.  These are the residual costs after the value  
      of by-products has been credited to the margin calculation. 
All prices and marginal costs are expressed on a per pound of wholesale meat basis. 
 In a perfectly competitive slaughter hog market we would observe the farm-wholesale 
price spread to be equal to the marginal cost of slaughter. 
 (3) P P Cw c− =  
  where:   Pw, Pf, and C are as defined above 
 Economic theory states (and empirical observation confirms) that the short run average 
cost curve of packing plants will be u-shaped as discussed in economics textbooks and illustrated 
in Figure 1. 
 Economic theory defines the “short run” as a time interval that is too short for the firm to 
alter the size of their fixed facilities.  Time intervals of up to one year thus satisfy the definition 
of short run in the meat packing industry.  Thus we would expect the average variable slaughter 
cost curve for a one week time interval to be a u-shaped cost curve. 
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 Note that the horizontal axis of Figure 1 is labeled rate of output per unit of time.  
Consequently, if one is examining week to week changes in the non-animal cost of slaughtering 
hogs, the appropriate slaughter rate is the number of animals slaughtered per day.    The total out- 
put per week or month is by definition the daily slaughter rate multiplied by the number of days 
in the time interval of interest.1 
 Designed capacity of a slaughter plant is defined as the slaughter rate at which average 
variable cost is at its minimum.  For example, Qo/day is the designed capacity of the slaughter 
plant depicted in Figure 1.  Note that the designed capacity of the plant is not the maximum 
slaughter rate at which the plant can physically operate.  The physical capacity is higher than the 
designed capacity of the plant.  Let Qp denote the physical capacity of the plant.   
 Economic theory clearly indicates that the marginal cost of slaughtering hogs is not 
constant as slaughter rates increase from Qo to Qp.  Indeed, economic theory suggests that the 
marginal cost of slaughter increases at an increasing rate as the rate of slaughter increases 
beyond the Qo slaughter rate.  Assumptions of constant marginal cost of meat packers made by 
Zhang and Sexton and numerous other authors are mathematically convenient, but are 
economically illogical. 
 Economic theory indicates that the marginal cost of slaughtering hogs might have the 
following simple mathematical form.2 
 (4) C a b Q b Q= + +1 2 2 
  where:   C  =   marginal cost of slaughter per wholesale pound of pork 
     Q  =   slaughter rate (head per day) at which the plant is being operated 
                                                 
1 See French et al., for discussion of the relationship between average and marginal processing costs and the rate of 
throughput in processing plants. 
2 This is only one of many mathematical expressions that might describe a marginal cost curve that increases at an 
increasing rate as the utilization rate of the plant increases. 
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 Economic theory suggests that in a well functioning slaughter hog market where packer 
margins are established at a level that just covers marginal cost of hog slaughter, we would 
observe the following relationship between farm-wholesale price spreads and the slaughter rate 
of hogs during the period for which the price spread is calculated and observed. 
(5) Sf-w = (Pw - Pf) = a + b1Q + b2Q2 
Equation 5 provides the economic foundation for estimating the marginal cost of slaugh-
tering hogs using observed weekly average farm-wholesale price spreads and corresponding 
slaughter rates over an historical period.  Estimation of the parameters of equation 5 also 
provides an empirical basis for evaluating the observed performance of the farm-wholesale price 
spread relative to a perfectly competitive market performance norm defined by economic theory. 
The parameters of equation 5 were estimated using observed weekly farm-wholesale 
price spreads and daily hog slaughter rates for the 1991-2001 period (574 weeks).  Data on the 
weekly farm-wholesale price spread were obtained from the LMIC data base.  The daily hog 
slaughter rate of hogs for each  week was calculated by dividing USDA FI slaughter for the week 
by the number of slaughter plant work days for the week.3 
Over the 574 week period during the calendar years 1991-2001, the F-W price spread 
averaged $11.72/cwt and ranged from $1.64 the week of May 25, 1991, to a high of $47.68 the 
week of December 19, 1998.  During this period the daily slaughter rate during the week aver-
aged 354,860 head.  The daily slaughter rate ranged from a low of 279,460 the week of July 6, 
1991, to a maximum of 427,289 the week of December 19, 1998. 
Parameters of the following equation were estimated using OLS. 
(6) Y = 185.31 – 1.230641Q + .002096Q2 R2 = .628 F = 483.3 
             (-7.09)             (8.54) 
 
                                                 
3 Slaughter work days in week provided by Ron Plain. 
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  where:   Y  =   F-W price spread 
     Q  =   daily FI slaughter rate during the week 
t values of parameters are shown in parentheses. 
 Variations in weekly slaughter rates explain 62.8 percent of the weekly variation in the  
F-W price spread over the 1991-2001 period.  The observed relationship between the F-W price 
spread and the daily slaughter rate is quite consistent with the relationship defined (predicted) by 
economic theory of F-W price spread determination in a perfectly competitive market. 
 Adding a simple linear time trend to the equation to perhaps reflect an increase in 
slaughter input operating costs over the 11 year period results in the following equation. 
 (7) Y = 209.489 – 1.34228Q1 + .002184Q2 + .015101T      R2 = .703   F=449.4 
                           (-8.6)             (9.9)             (11.9) 
 
where: T is a time variable defined by the number of the week in the 574 week   
             period. 
This simple equation, describing the relationship between observed price spreads and the 
slaughter rate that would exist in a perfectly competitive market, explains 70.3 percent of the 
weekly variation in the F-W price spread for hogs over the 574 week period of the calendar years 
1991-2001.  Moreover, the F value of 449.4 for this simple equation means that, based on 574 
weeks of observed data relationships, the hypothesis that the short run cost curve of the 
industry is not u-shaped can be rejected at the 99%+ level of confidence. 
 As described above, equations (6) and (7) are estimates of the industry marginal cost 
curve of the U.S. pork packing industry.  This is an estimate of the industry marginal cost curve.  
It is not the marginal cost curve of a representative or average firm in the industry.  Since it is an 
industry MC curve, it reflects the MC of the least efficient (highest cost) firms in the industry. 
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 The u-shape of the packer average cost curve is clearly demonstrated by columns 1 and 2 
of Table 1.  As indicated earlier, the average daily slaughter rate over the 1991-2001 period was 
354.86.  The marginal cost of slaughtering 300,000 hd/day is 24 percent lower than the marginal 
cost of slaughtering 350,000 hogs/day.  In contrast, the marginal cost increases sharply as the 
slaughter rate increases.  When the industry operates at the slaughter rates of 400,000 and of 
425,000 hd/day (levels observed during 1998-1999), the marginal costs are respectively, 93 
percent and 165 percent higher than when the industry operates at the average rate of 350,000 
hogs/day. 
Implications 
 This analysis demonstrates that a single variable – the daily slaughter rate – explains 62.8 
percent in the week-to-week variability in the observed F-W price spread over the 574 week 
period of calendar years 1991-2001.  Adding a simple linear time trend to the equation raises the 
explanation of weekly variations in the F-W price spread to 70.3 percent. 
 The observed variation in weekly price spreads are highly consistent with the assumption 
(assertion) that observed weekly changes (performance) in the F-W price spread were generated 
by a “perfectly competitive” slaughter industry where the charge for slaughtering services is 
equal to the marginal cost of slaughtering services.  The period of analysis includes the 1998-
1999 period when the F-W price spread reached record levels – at the same time that the daily 
slaughter rate also reached historically high levels.  Note also the close temporal connection 
between the lowest F-W price spread during the week of May 25, 1991, and the lowest weekly 
slaughter rate in July 1991. 
 Advocates of the “meat packers were exploiting their market power” conspiracy theory 
as an explanation of  the record high  margins in  1998-1999,  point to the  high level of  industry  
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Table 1: Computed Marginal Slaughter Cost, Live Prices, Farm Level Price Flexibilities 
  and Wholesale Prices Using Estimated Equations 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Farm Level Demand Daily 
Slaughter 
Rate 
Marginal 
Cost of 
Slaughter 
Live 
Price2/ 
Slope of 
Demand Curve 
Price 
Flexibility3/ 
 
Wholesale 
Price3/ 
1000 hd 
 
275 
 
300 
 
325 
 
350 
 
375 
 
400 
 
425 
 
450 
 
475 
 
$ cwt1/ 
 
14.26 
 
12.09 
 
12.66 
 
15.96 
 
21.99 
 
30.75 
 
42.23 
 
56.45 
 
73.40 
$ cwt1/ 
 
91.64 
 
79.05 
 
69.01 
 
57.79 
 
47.80 
 
37.97 
 
27.74 
 
17.02 
 
  5.66 
 
 
.104 
 
.052 
 
0 
 
-.052 
 
-.104 
 
-.156 
 
-.208 
 
-.260 
 
-.312 
 
 
+.312 
 
+.198 
 
0 
 
-.314 
 
-.814 
 
-1.64 
 
-3.18 
 
-6.87 
 
-26.16 
$ cwt1/ 
 
92.85 
 
80.77 
 
71.06 
 
63.11 
 
56.51 
 
50.96 
 
46.24 
 
42.20 
 
36.70 
 
1/wholesale weight 
 
2/Calculated using equation (10) at T = 574, (last week of December 2001) and using wholesale 
price shown in column 6. 
 
3/Calculated using equation (16) with wholesale price of beef at its 10 year average of $111.41 
and the retail price of pork at its average value of $226.48. 
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profits during this period as evidence supporting their position.  To the contrary.  In a perfectly 
competitive market where (a) marginal costs increase exponentially with rate of plant utilization 
and (b) the payment extracted for slaughtering services (F-W price spread) is exactly equal the 
marginal cost of processing (which would occur in a perfectly competitive market), producer 
surplus (short run operating profits) increase rapidly as marginal cost increases.  Economic 
theory of a perfectly competitive market clearly states that record levels of profit per unit of time 
will be achieved as a result of marginal cost pricing of slaughter services when the capacity of 
the slaughter system is stressed.  Economic theory of a perfectly competitive packing industry 
clearly explains/predicts the observed behavior of the U.S. meat packing industry as the 
utilization rate of fixed plant facilities increases.  The predictions/explanations of the economic 
theory of a perfectly competitive slaughter market are totally consistent with observed changes in 
weekly price spreads and industry profit levels over the 1991-2001 period. 
 Clearly the CR-4 for the U.S. pork slaughter industry increased over the 1991-2001 
period.  However, there certainly were not weekly increases and decreases in the concentration 
ratio and hence weekly changes in “market power” of meat packers over this period.  The 
“market power theory” is simply incapable of providing either a theoretical or empirical basis for 
explaining the observed volatility in weekly average price spreads over the 1991-2001 period. 
 Suppose we let the time trend variable in equation (7) represent the economic impacts on 
weekly changes in price spreads of increased industry concentration.  In that case, we observe 
that weekly variation in the daily slaughter rate explains 62.8 percent of the variation in the F-W 
price spread (equation 6).  If the time trend represents increased industry concentration, then one 
might argue that increased industry concentration over the 1991-2001 period accounted for 
(explains) 70.3 – 62.8 = 7.5 percent of the weekly variation in the F-W price spread over this 
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period.  This is hardly a convincing argument that increased industry concentration significantly 
impacted the performance of the pork packing industry over the 1991-2001 period. 
 The dominant factor affecting weekly variation in F-W price spreads is the daily rate of 
slaughter which is exactly what the theory of a perfectly competitive slaughter market predicts.  
Based on market performance measures derived from economic theory of a perfectly competitive 
market, the hypothesis that the U.S. slaughter hog market is a perfectly competitive market 
cannot be rejected. 
Estimation of Farm Level Derived Demand for Slaughter Hogs 
 The farm level derived demand for slaughter hogs is defined by equation (2).  The farm 
level derived demand for hogs is the schedule of the maximum price that packers are willing to 
pay for hogs given the current wholesale price of pork products (Pw) and the current daily 
slaughter rate of hogs (Q).  Thus, the farm level derived demand for slaughter hogs by a perfectly 
competitive slaughter industry is described by equation (8) which is obtained by substituting 
equation (5) into equation (2). 
 (8) P P  c Q Qf w= − + +β β β1 2 2( )3
 The parameters of equation (8) were estimated by OLS using observed weekly prices 
over the 574 week period of calendar years 1991-2001.  The resulting equation is: 
 (9) Pf = -98.201 + 1.101352Pw + .6266Q - .00106Q2  R2 = .951 F = 3685 
                                                     (68)               (6.8)        (-8.1) 
where:   Pf  = week average price of slaughter hogs in Iowa and Minnesota 
(USDA) 
 
               Pw  = wholesale cutout value ($ cwt) of pork carcass (LMIC) 
    Q    = daily slaughter rate as previously described. 
  t-values of estimated parameters in parentheses 
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Adding a linear time trend to the equation results in the following: 
 (10) Pf  =  -120.688 + 1.203886Pw + .676085Q - .00104Q2 - .01172T  R2 = .9687         F = 4406 
                                                            (85.12)           (9.20)         (-9.99)       (17.97) 
 
  where: all variables are the same as for equation (8) 
  t-values of estimated parameters are in parentheses 
 The relationship between the farm price of hogs, the wholesale price of pork, and the 
daily slaughter rate postulated by the economic theory of a perfectly competitive market 
(equation 8) fits the observed data like a glove.  The F values for estimated equations (9) and 
(10) mean that the hypothesis that observed weekly relationships between farm prices of hogs 
and the wholesale prices of pork over the 1991-2001 period reflects the performance of a 
“non-competitive” market can be rejected at the 99%+ level of confidence. 
 The structure of the U.S. hog slaughter industry clearly is oligopsonistic.  A small 
number of firms slaughter a large share of total hog slaughter.  However, the results of the above 
analyses clearly demonstrate that we cannot reject either of the following null hypotheses 
derived from the economic theory of a perfectly competitive market. 
1) The derived demand for hogs by the structurally oligopsonistic U.S. hog slaughter 
industry is not different from what the derived farm level demand for hogs would be 
with a much larger number of slaughter firms. 
2) The observed performance of the oligopsonistic slaughter industry is not different 
from the performance of a perfectly competitive slaughter industry. 
Farm Level Price Flexibility of Demand 
 The farm level derived demand for slaughter hogs is a quadratic function of the daily 
slaughter rate (equation 10).  Hence, the slope of the price-dependent farm level derived demand 
equation is a linear function of the daily slaughter rate (Q). 
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 (11) 
∂
∂Q  
P
Qf = −. .676085 00208
Consequently, the farm level price flexibility of demand coefficient is a quadratic function of Q. 
 
( )
(. . )( )
(
. .
)
12
676085 00208
67608 00208 2
F
P
Q
Q
P
Q
Q
P
Q Q
P
P
f
f
f
f
f
= ⋅
= −
= −
∂
∂
 
 The impact of increases in the daily slaughter rate on the farm price is shown in columns 
3-5 of Table 1.  An increase in the daily slaughter rate from 300-325 (an 8.3% increase) results in 
a 12.7% reduction in the price of hogs.  However, an increase in the slaughter rate from 400-425 
(a 6.25% increase) generates a 26.9% reduction in the price of hogs.  The doubling of the 
sensitivity of the hog prices when the slaughter rate increases from 400 to 425 compared to the 
price reduction when the slaughter rate increases from 300 to 325 reflects the mathematical 
properties of the farm level price flexibility coefficient rather than exercise of market power as 
often suggested by observers. 
Wholesale Derived Demand for Pork 
 The amount of wholesale pork injected into the wholesale market as a result of 
slaughtering Qt animals is defined by equation (13). 
 (13) Q k  Q Dt
w
t t= ⋅( )
  where: Q  =  amount of wholesale pork products injected to the wholesale t
w
               market in week t 
 
    k     =  the number of pounds of wholesale meat injected into the market 
    in week t 
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   Qt     =  daily slaughter rate during week t 
   Dt     =  number of days the slaughter plants operated during week t 
 It is physically impossible to move Q  through the wholesale market during the same 
week the animals are slaughtered.  Moreover, significant portions of the wholesale pork products 
require additional time (at least two weeks) for processing/curing before the meat is ready for 
sale to retailers.  Consequently, the quantity of pork supplied to (moving through) the wholesale 
market in week t (W
t
w
t) is a mix of meat obtained from animals slaughtered over the previous three 
(or more) weeks.  (Bullock,d) 
  
( )
.
( ) ( ) ( )14
10
1 1 2 2 3 3
1 2 3
W Q Q Qt t
w
t
w
t
w= + +
+ + =
− −α α α
α α αwhere:    
−
                                                
 The wholesale demand schedule for pork is the schedule of the maximum prices that 
retailers are willing to pay for the amount of pork moving through the market in the current time 
period.  The wholesale demand for pork meat products is determined by the amount of pork 
products moving through the wholesale market in week t (Wt), the retail price of pork (Ppr), and 
the wholesale prices of beef (Pbw) and chicken (Pwc). 
(15) Ppw  =  f(W, Ppr, Pwb, Pwc) 
where:  Ppw  =  wholesale price of pork 
 W      =  amount of pork products moving through the market4 
 Ppr    =  retail price of pork 
   Pwb   =  wholesale price of beef 
   Pwc   =  wholesale price of chicken 
 
4 For this analysis the following arbitrary values were assigned α1 = 50, α2 = 30, and α3 = 20.  Other values are likely 
more appropriate.  These values are selected only to illustrate the point. 
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 Weekly prices of chicken are not available and are not included in the analysis.  Weekly 
average retail prices of pork are also not available.  The reported monthly average price is held 
constant at the monthly average price for all weeks in each month.  Hence, retail pork prices 
change monthly while all other variables change weekly.5 
 The estimated parameters of the price dependent wholesale demand for pork are shown in 
equation (16). 
(16)   RP P Wpw bw pt= −21 29015 205832 1 6012 477334, . . . .P
                                                
2 = .607 F = 292.76  
 Equation (7) and equation (16) illustrate the disconnection between and the relative 
magnitudes of the price flexibility of demand for live hogs and the price flexibility for wholesale 
pork.  The existence of a u-shaped variable cost curve of producing slaughter services means that 
the magnitude farm level price flexibility coefficient is an exponential function of the slaughter 
rate.  In contrast, the wholesale level price flexibility is not a quadratic function of Q and may 
quite logically be constant across all values of Q as estimated in equation (16) and illustrated in 
Table 1. 
 Hence, the sharp divergence between wholesale prices and live hog prices during 1998-
1999 simply reflects the different economic realities of the farm level and wholesale levels of the 
market.  The last column of Table 1 illustrates the wholesale level prices of pork corresponding 
with equation (16).  These price changes as Q increases above 350 are much smaller than 
corresponding price changes at the farm level that would be generated by a perfectly competitive 
slaughter hog market. 
 
5 The same procedure was tried for chicken prices.  However, the coefficient on this variable was not significant.  
Hence, the wholesale price of chicken is not included in the equation reported here. 
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Conclusions 
 The market outcomes (market clearing prices and quantities) of a perfectly competitive 
market are recognized by economists as defining the socially optimal market outcomes.   Perfect 
market outcomes therefore are the performance norms by which observed market outcomes are 
measured in order to evaluate the performance of a market. 
 These performance norms of a perfectly competitive market are quite simple.  In the form 
dimension, the price difference between two forms of the product (e.g., live hogs and wholesale 
meat) should be less than or equal to the marginal cost of transformation (e.g., marginal cost of 
slaughter). 
 This paper derived the theoretical relationships between hog prices and wholesale pork 
price, and hence the F-W price spread that would exist in a perfectly competitive slaughter hog 
market.  These performance norms were then confronted with observed weekly price/quantity 
relationships over the 1991-2001 period to compare observed market performance with the ideal 
performance norms derived from the economic theory of a perfectly competitive market. 
 These results demonstrate a high degree of consistency between the performance norms 
defined by the economic theory of a perfectly competitive market and the observed relationship 
between live and wholesale prices (and hence the F-W price spread) observed in the U.S. 
hog/pork market over the 574 weeks of calendar years 1991-2001. 
 These statistical analyses enable us to reject at the 99%+ level of confidence two 
important hypotheses. 
(1.) The short run marginal cost of pork packing plants is not u-shaped. 
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(2.) The observed performance of the U.S. slaughter hog market over the 1991-2001 
period is not consistent with the performance norms defined by the operation of a 
perfectly competitive market. 
The first hypothesis is important because it clearly shows the inappropriateness of 
assuming that packer marginal costs are constant that is often used by market power hunters to 
develop measures of market power.  These researchers have assumed away any economic 
explanation of changes in the F-W price spread based on changes in slaughter cost caused by 
variation in slaughter rate.  The observed fluctuations in price spreads (which are totally 
explained/justified by the existence of a u-shaped short run packer cost curve) have incorrectly 
been claimed by these researchers as evidence of the exercise of market power. 
Rejection of the second hypothesis clearly demonstrates that structure does not matter in 
the U.S. hog market.  Concentration ratios are at best an interesting statistic describing the 
structure of the industry.  Concentration ratios provide no information (or basis for testing 
hypothesis) regarding the performance of the U.S. hog slaughter market.  Concentration ratios 
certainly provide neither a theoretical nor an empirical basis for rejecting without testing the null 
hypothesis that observed market performance is no different from the performance of a perfectly 
competitive market.  Conjured up measures of market power based upon concentration ratios and 
economically invalid measurement techniques is simply junk science.  The Agricultural 
Economics literature contains numerous examples of such efforts. 
 Contrary to widely held conventional wisdom, in spite of high levels of meat packer 
concentration, the performance of the U.S. slaughter market over the 1991-2001 period was not 
different from the “ideal performance” that would have been observed in a perfectly competitive 
market.  There simply is not any evidence to support allegations of abuse of market power by 
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meat packers.  Indeed, observed rates of return to the meat packing industry over the 1991-2001 
period were rather dismal.  Observed relationships between live and wholesale prices (and hence 
the F-W spread) and also packer short run profits are totally consistent with (explained by) an 
economic model of a perfectly  competitive meat packing industry operating with a u-shaped 
short run variable cost curve. 
The bottom line of the analysis reported here is that market performance is what 
matters.  Industry structure is irrelevant if market performance is ideal.  Concern about, and 
policy proposals to alter, industry structure are not justified based on observed performance of 
the packing industry over the 1991-2001 period. 
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